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any quotations with him.FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES AND INSULATION: A REEXAMINATION
by
Joachim Fels*
Will a country embedded in an integrated world economy be
able to completely insulate its economy from foreign economic
disturbances by letting its currency float freely in the
foreign exchange market? Both theoretical considerations and
the actual experience after the movement to flexible exchange
rates among the major currencies in 1973 suggest that the
answer is no. According to conventional wisdom, however, the
early advocates of flexible exchange rates in the 1950s and
1960s believed in the ability of floating rates to completely
insulate an economy from disturbances originating abroad. This
statement is frequently cited to show that the case for fle-
xible exchange rates may not be as strong as it originally
seemed to be, since part of the case appears to have rested on
an erroneous belief.
It is one purpose of this paper to point out that,
contrary to a widespread view, the outstanding early advocates
of flexible exchange rates like Milton Friedman (1953), Egon
Sohmen (1961; 1969) and Harry Johnson (1969) never promised
complete and automatic insulation from all kinds of foreign
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Egon
Sohmen Memorial Conference held at Tegernsee, Bavaria, on
August 31 and September 1, 1990. I am grateful to John
Chipman, Herbert Giersch, Herbert Grubel, Anne Krueger, Robert
Mundell, Friedrich Schneider, and Regine Sohmen for comments
and discussion.- 2 -
economic disturbances. In fact, their argument was more
refined. The main purpose of the paper is to contrast Sohmen's
true promise, as well as that of other theorists', with the
empirical evidence from the period of floating exchange rates
since 197 3 and to discuss several explanations for some
remaining discrepancies between predictions and outcome.
I. The Promise of the Early Believers
In order to assess the view of the leading early-
proponents of flexible exchange rates on the insulation issue
it is crucial to define carefully the sources and the nature of
the supposed foreign disturbances. For example, it makes a
difference whether the source of the foreign disturbance is a
monetary or a fiscal shock and whether the disturbance affects
prices or output, or both. In general, the degree of insulation
provided by flexible exchange rates will differ according to
the source and nature of the foreign shock.
In his celebrated case for flexible exchange rates, Milton
Friedman (1953, pp. 199-200) asserted that freely floating
rates would mitigate the transmission of foreign monetary dis-
turbances by insulating the domestic price level from foreign
inflation or deflation. Yet the domestic economy would still be
affected by a possible change in foreign real output caused by
the foreign monetary disturbance. Insulation would thus not be
perfect under flexible exchange rates, but each country would- 3 -
be able to "seek for monetary stability according to its own
lights" (p. 200).
In contrast to that, economists rooted in the Keynesian
tradition were more interested in the question whether floating
rates would provide insulation from fluctuations in foreign
output and employment. The early open-economy versions of the
Keynesian model concentrated on trade in goods and services as
the only transmission channel of economic disturbances between
countries. The neglect of capital movements in the analyses in
the 1940s and 1950s was obviously influenced by the vast amount
of restrictions on the free flow of capital between countries
that had been implemented during the interwar years. At that
time, trade in assets had become negligible by historical
standards.
Perhaps the most influential contribution in this
tradition was James Meade's (1951) analysis of internal and
external balance. The "Meade Paradigm" ' consists of a simple
two-country model where each country produces its own specific
output. Wages and prices are fixed, expectations are static,
and aggregate demand determines output and employment. Aggre-
gate demand, in turn, can be varied systematically by monetary
and fiscal policies ("financial policies" in Meade's
terminology) .
The results derived from the model for the transmission of
economic disturbances from one country to the other are
1) This term was coined by Michael Mussa (1979, p. 165).- 4 -
straightforward. Under flexible exchange rates without capital
mobility, incipient trade surpluses or deficits of the home
country caused by a foreign fiscal or monetary disturbance lead
to adjustments of the exchange rate in such a way that the
incipient trade imbalance is eliminated. Thus, the only channel
for transmission is interrupted and a country is completely
insulated from foreign output fluctuations. It is this strong
result that must be in the mind of those observers who accuse
the early proponents of flexible exchange rates of having held
an extremely naive view.
Egon Sohmen, like Friedman, is certainly innocent of that
accusation, however. Evidence is provided by his various
contributions to the theory of flexible exchange rates, the
most comprehensive of which being the monograph that developed
out of his Ph.D. thesis submitted at the M.I.T. in 1958 (
Sohmen, 1961; 1969). Sohmen focused on the effects flexible
exchange rates would have on income and employment. Like the
"Meade Paradigm", he employed the Keynesian framework in
assuming that money wages and prices are constant, or almost
constant, in the presence of unemployment and excess capacity.
But unlike the "Meade Paradigm", he concluded that flexible
exchange rates would not serve as perfect stabilizers of na-
tional income in the face of foreign disturbances. The result
followed from two seperate lines of reasoning.
The first line of reasoning preserves the assumption that
capital is immobile between countries. As a consequence, the
trade balance, or the current account, is kept in balance at
every instant in time by the flexible exchange rate; the- 5 -
transmission of foreign income fluctuations through trade sur-
pluses or deficits thus becomes impossible. However, Sohmen
(1961, p. 95) pointed out that, while exports and imports in
nominal terms would be forced into equality by flexible ex-
change rates, real exports and imports would not necessarily
change in the same direction. For example, an appreciation of
the domestic currency in the course of a foreign boom would
leave the nominal external balance unchanged but would imply an
import surplus in real terms that, ceteris paribus, would
depress real output in the home country. Therefore, foreign
booms would cause a recession in the home country. Conversely,
a foreign recession would have an expansionary impact on the
domestic economy.
An inverse transmission of business cycles in a model
without capital flows had also been found by Laursen and Metz-
ler (1950). It is interesting to note that Sohmen (1961, pp. 92
f.) initially considered his analysis as being merely a
restatement of the well-known Laursen-Metzler effect. In a
later article he revised that view and demonstrated that his
transmission mechanism was different from that of Laursen and
Metzler, though the result of an inverse transmission of
business cycles under flexible exchange rates in the absence of
2) capital movements was the same (Sohmen, 1974). '
2) I do not intend to display the details of the two models
here since the task has already been accomplished by
Ernst-August Behnke (1980), one of Sohmen's former research
assistants.- 6 -
In Sohmen's own words, "[a]part from its theoretical in-
terest, too much should not be made of the Laursen-Metzler
effect" (1961, p. 99). ' The main reason for his claim was that
capital mobility, by assumption, was absent from the analysis.
While being a viable device for analyzing one effect at a time,
a model abstracting from capital flows seemed to miss an im-
portant aspect of reality already in the early 1960s. In the
presence of capital flows, trade surpluses or deficits could
occur and could lead to a transmission of business cycles
similar to that under fixed exchange rates. For example, a boom
in the foreign country accompanied by rising interest rates
would lead to a capital outflow from the home country and the
expansionary effect of the resulting current account surplus
could well overcompensate the negative Laursen-Metzler-Sohmen
effect of the foreign expansion on domestic income. Thus, under
flexible exchange rates with capital mobility, positive or ne-
gative transmission could occur; there would be no automatic
insulation from foreign business cycles.
Still, according to Sohmen (1961, p. lOOn), in a system of
flexible exchange rates a country could always counteract the
effects of foreign business cycles on domestic income and
employment by the appropriate use of domestic monetary
policies. It is a recurrent theme in Sohmen's writings that
monetary policy becomes a powerful tool under flexible exchange
3) Note that this remark also refers to Sohmen's own analysis
because at the time of writing he thought it to be identical to
that of Laursen and Metzler.- 7 -
rates when capital is mobile internationally. Cyclical un-
employment, caused by domestic or foreign influences, could
always be eliminated rapidly by monetary expansion, which would
immediately depreciate the exchange rate and thereby improve
the trade balance, the improvement being equal to the capital
exports induced by the fall in domestic interest rates. To
Sohmen, this freedom of monetary policy for the purpose of
4) domestic stabilization ' was
"perhaps the most persuasive reason for the advocacy of
flexible exchanges [ . . . ] and deserves to be stressed all
the more since it appears that it has never received
attention elsewhere" (1961, p. 84).
Nowadays, the emphasis on short-term, countercyclical demand
management may sound somewhat outdated. However, it should not
be forgotten that at the time of Sohmen's writing it was
generally accepted that activist fiscal and monetary policies
could, and ought to, keep the economy on an even keel by "fine-
tuning" . In any case, Sohmen deserves credit for being the
first to highlight the consequences of a move to flexible ex-
change rates for the effectiveness of monetary policies.
He has to share this credit with Robert Mundell, however,
without whom this short survey of the early theorists of fle-
xible exchange rates would be incomplete. Unlike Friedman and
Sohmen, Mundell was not an ardent supporter of flexible ex-
change rates, but rather concentrated on the positive analysis
of the role played by international capital mobility in
4) The policy-autonomy argument for flexible exchange rates was
later augmented by Harry Johnson (1969) to include monetary,
fiscal and other policy instruments.- 8 -
determining the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies
under fixed and under flexible exchange rates. The Mundell-
Fleming model is still an integral part of received wisdom in
international macroeconomics. ' It may suffice here to summarize
briefly the well-known results derived from the two-country
version of the model (Mundell, 1968, pp. 262-271) for the inter-
national transmission of economic policies when exchange rates
are flexible. A monetary expansion (contraction) in one country
will depress (raise) output and employment in the other country
if capital is perfectly mobile internationally. Yet a fiscal
expansion (contraction) will have a positive (negative) effect
on foreign output and employment. Thus, the sign of the spill-
over effect depends on the source of the initial disturbance,
fiscal or monetary. Insulation no longer prevails in the fle-
xible exchange rate system if capital is free to move between
countries.
This quick overview, to sum up, has shown that the early
analysts and proponents of flexible exchange rates did not
believe in the ability of such a system to provide automatic or
complete insulation from foreign disturbances. They stressed,
however, that domestic monetary policies would be free to
pursue domestic goals under flexible exchange rates and could
thus, in principle, be employed to neutralize undesired macro-
economic influences from abroad. While some analysts emphasized
5) Frenkel and Razin (1987, p. 568) call it "the 'work horse'
of traditional open-economy macroeconomics". The relevant
articles by Mundell were first published in the early 1960s and
are collected in Mundell (1968); see also Fleming (1962).- 9 -
the advantages of attaining domestic price level stability in
an inflationary or deflationary world, others focused on the
possibility of stabilizing income and employment by alert and
flexible countercyclical policies in the face of foreign booms
or slumps.
II. Evidence from the post-1973 Period
In this section, I compare the behavior of a few important
macroeconomic variables from a large sample of industrial
countries during the period of generalized floating since 1973
to their behavior during the preceding fixed-rate years of 1960
to 197 3 in order to see whether the hopes of the early advo-
cates of flexible exchange rates have been fulfilled. Such an
approach of simple before-after comparisons is, of course, sub-
ject to the strong caveat that not all the observed differences
in the behavior of the variables under the two exchange-rate
regimes must necessarily result from the switch to flexible
exchange rates. Rather, the underlying structure of the economy
may have changed for other reasons. What would be required,
ideally, is a full structural model of the economies under con-
sideration, which would allow us to control for all other
changes in the economic environment in order to identify the
pure impact of a switch from fixed to floating exchange rates.
However, constructing and estimating such a model is
impossible. For the purpose of this paper it may suffice,
instead, to employ some simple statistical measures of dis-
persion and relatedness, such as standard deviations and- 10 -
correlation coefficients, as a first approximation. I shall
come back to the caveats later.
A first and rather intuitive way of testing the pro-
position that flexible exchange rates allow for a greater
autonomy of monetary policy is to examine the cross-country
variability of the growth rates of the money supply under fixed
and under floating exchange rates. A higher divergence of
monetary trends under flexible rates would indicate that
monetary policies have become more independent from external
constraints.
Table 1 presents the mean and the standard deviation of
the growth rates of Ml in a sample of 19 industrial countries
for each year from 1960 through 1987, and for the period
averages 1960-73 and 1974-87. No clear-cut picture emerges from
a comparison of the cross-country variability of money growth
rates before 1973 and since. The yearly standard deviations of
Ml growth rates fall in a range of 4.5 to 8.6 percentage points
for the fixed-rate period, as compared to a range of 4.2 to 8.6
percentage points for the flexible-rate period. There is no
observable general increase in the yearly standard deviations
after the advent of generalized floating. For the two period
averages, there is even a small decline in the standard
deviation of Ml growth rates in the post-197 3 period. Thus, in
the fixed-rate years the long-run growth rates of Ml in in-
dustrial countries diverged more than in the flexible-rate
years.
It is interesting to note, however, that two out of the
three single years exhibiting the highest standard deviations- 11 -
Table 1: Cross-Country Variability of Inflation Rates and Money
Supply Growth Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates












































































































































































Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, U.K., and United States. Mean and standard devia-
tions for 1960-73 and 1974-89 (1974-87 for Ml growth) are of
period averages.
Sources: See Data Appendix.- 12 -
fall in the recent period of floating (1985 and 1987). Further-
more, the third year (1973) was, on closer inspection, also
characterized more by the floating-rate system than by the
fixed-rate system of Bretton Woods because the latter already
dissolved in March 1973. Directly after the event, the monetary
authorities apparently used their newly acquired freedom to
inflate or deflate at will.
But even if the year 197 3 is omitted from the fixed-rate
period, it still appears to be a puzzling fact that the growth
rates of the money supplies varied so much across countries in
the Bretton Woods years. Yet the puzzle can be rationalized in
three ways. First, an essential feature of the Bretton Woods
system of fixed (but adjustable) exchange rates was the wide-
spread existence of capital controls which had been implemented
and were maintained for the very reason of enabling countries
to enjoy at least some leeway for monetary autonomy. ' Second,
additional leeway was provided by the possibility of changing
the official parity in certain circumstances. Third,
differences in the money demand between countries will, in a
fixed rate system, necessarily lead to divergent developments
in the money supplies since domestic prices cannot diverge much
6) Actually, the promise that countries with flexible exchange
rates could enjoy monetary autonomy without having to resort to
welfare-reducing capital controls and trade barriers was one of
the most powerful arguments of the advocates of floating rates.* I • Vat IN.
des Jnstituts fur Welfwirtschaft
- 13 -
from foreign prices with fixed exchange rates, a point empha-
sized by Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 314).
Moreover, there is a basic reason why, in general> it may.
be inappropriate to draw inferences for the degree of monetary
autonomy from the dispersion of the growth rates of the money
supply. The money supply is only an instrument, not the final
target variable, of monetary policy. In the last analysis, the
essence of monetary policy is to achieve a targetted inflation
rate (or a targetted unemployment rate). Therefore, it makes
more sense to compare the cross-country variability of possible
target variables under alternative exchange rate systems in
order to assess whether the degree of policy autonomy differs
according to the exchange rate system. To illustrate this
point, consider two countries, each aiming at a different in-
flation rate under flexible exchange rate. If, for example, the
growth rates of natural output differ between the two
countries, it may well be that the growth rates of their money
supplies consistent with their targetted inflation rates will
be identical. Obviously, an observer who passes his judgement
on the degree of monetary autonomy in the two countries by com-
paring the growth rates of the national money supplies will end
up with a wrong conclusion. He would rather have to check
whether the target variables diverge from each other in order
to be able to pass judgement on the degree of monetary
autonomy.
Evidence on the cross-country variability of inflation
rates in my sample of 19 industrial countries is presented in
Table 1. The results confirm that flexible exchange rates allow- 14 -
for a greater divergence of inflation rates between
countries. ' In the years from 1960 through 1973, the standard
deviations of inflation rates range from 1.1 to 2.4 percentage
points. They are relatively low as compared to that of Ml
growth in the same years, and as compared to the standard
deviations of inflation rates after 1973. The standard
deviations of inflation rates in the flexible-rate period are
higher in each year from 1974 through 1987 than in 1965, which
was the year with the highest cross-country variability in the
8) fixed-rate period. '
However, the standard deviations of inflation rates in the
recent years 1988 and 1989 are lower than in some of the
Bretton Woods years. This shows that inflation rates do not
necessarily have to diverge more under flexible exchange rates
than under fixed rates. Flexible exchange rates allow countries
to realize their preferred inflation rates. Yet preferences may
change, and apparently the inflation preferences of industrial
countries converged in the past couple of years after more than
a decade of experimentation with greater differences in in-
flation rates.
In sum, the results on the cross-country variability of
inflation show that under flexible exchange rates countries
7) Similar results are reported by Swoboda (1983) and Darby and
Lothian (1989).
8) Note that the standard deviations in the post-1973 period
are even likely to be biassed in a downward direction by the
fact that many of the 19 countries in the sample have formed
regional fixed-rate systems, like the EMS.- 15 -
enjoyed greater monetary independence in the sense of Friedman.
To many observers, this monetary independence has been one of
the negative features, rather than one of the positive, of the
flexible exchange rate system. According to that camp, the
Bretton Woods system acted as a disciplinary force against
inflationary policies in participating countries. The loss of
discipline that occurred with the demise of the Bretton Woods
system in 1973, so the argument goes, led to the outburst of
inflation in the course of the seventies and early eighties.
A more plausible view, however, is that causality ran from
inflationary policies in the reserve center to the breakdown of
the fixed-rate system, rather than vice versa. Inflationary
pressures had already begun to build up in the late 1960s and
early 1970s (see Table 1); and the main reason for the
abandonment of fixed rates was that some countries were no
longer willing to parallel the inflationary policies of the
United States. Those countries enjoyed a degree of (relative)
9} price stability
 ; after 1973 that would have been impossible to
achieve, had the Bretton Woods system been kept in place.
Another interesting question is whether flexible exchange
rates have enabled countries to make their economies more in-
dependent from foreign output fluctuations, too. To answer this
question, I have calculated simple contemporaneous correlation
9) Note that only three countries in my sample of 19 countries
had a lower average inflation,rate in the 1974-89 period than
in the 1960-73 period, namely Japan, Switzerland and the
Netherlands. This is evidence of the general increase in the
propensity to inflate in the 1970s.- 16 -
coefficients of detrended quarterly indices of industrial pro-
duction for eleven industrial countries for a fixed-rate period
(1961:2 to 1973:1) and a flexible-rate period (1973:2 to
1989:4).
The results are reported in Table 2. A comparison of the
correlations among the eleven countries' output fluctuations
over the fixed-rates years with corresponding correlations over
the flexible-rate years reveals a marked increase in the co-
movement of business cycles from the fixed to the floating-rate
period. In 43 out of a total of 55 cases, the correlation
coefficient is higher in the post-1973 period than in the
pre-1973 period. Many correlations (about one quarter) are ne-
gative in the first period, whereas all but three are positive
in the second period. Furthermore, only five out of 55
correlation coefficients in the Bretton Woods years are
statistically significant at the five percent level; in com-
parison, 31 out of 55 are significant (and positive) in the
flexible rate period.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that business cycles
have been more synchronized by far under flexible exchange
rates than they were under fixed exchange rates. ' This result
10) Similar results have been obtained by Ripley (1978),
Swoboda (1983), Huber and Saidi (1983), de Grauwe and Fratianni
(1984), Gerlach (1988), Everaet (1988), and Darby and Lothian
(1989). Some (weak) evidence for less synchronization under
flexible exchange rates was found by Baxter and Stockman (1989)
for the post-1973 period, and by Choudhri and Kochin (1980) for
the great depression.- 17 -
Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Detrended Industrial Production Under Fixed
















































































































































Notes; Correlation coefficients in the upper right triangle are for the
flexible-rate period (1973:2 to 1989:4); those in the lower left triangle
are for the fixed-rate period (1961:2 to 1973:1). Correlation coefficients
denoted with an asterisk (*) are significant at the five percent level. The
seasonally adjusted quarterly indices of industrial production were
detrended by computing first differences of the natural logarithms of the
time series. The country symbols are: US = United States, CAN = Canada, JAP
= Japan, U.K. = United Kingdom, GER = Germany, FRA = France, ITA = Italy,
NET = Netherlands, IRE = Ireland, SWE = Sweden, and SWI = Switzerland.
Sources: See Data Appendix.-18 -
seems to be at odds with Sohmen's notion that flexible exchange
rates would enable countries to make domestic output and
employment more independent from foreign business cycles by
freeing monetary policy from external constraints. However,
there are several explanations for the observed synchronization
of business cycles under flexible exchange rates that render
Sohmen's view consistent with the post-1973 evidence. These
explanations are discussed in the following section.
Ill. Why Have Business Cycles Been So Synchronized Under
Flexible Exchange Rates?
There are three sets of explanations for the observed
increase in the synchronization of business cycles since the
movement to generalized floating in the early 1970s. The first
set of explanations evolves around the proposition that there
has been a marked increase in the positive transmission of
business cycles after 1973. The second set of explanations
attributes the higher comovement of business cycles to the
synchronization of economic policies in the 1970s and 1980s.
The third explanation emphasizes the role of common exogenous
real shocks like the two oil price hikes in the 1970s and the
early 1980s. In this section, I discuss the three explanations
in turn.
The increase in the positive transmission of business
cycles, which according to the first explanation is responsible
for the observed international synchronization of output move-
ments after 197 3, is very likely to be related to the growing- 19 -
economic integration among countries in the last couple of de-
cades. The basic reason for the increase in interdependence and
integration is the steady decline in international trans-
portation and communication costs as a consequence of tech-
nological progress, an argument emphasized by Richard Cooper
(1985) and Herbert Giersch (1989). These long-run improvements
in international transportation and communication are indepen-
dent of the exchange-rate regime. Cooper (1985, p. 1207)
argues, however, that the move to flexible exchange rates may
have acted as a brake upon growing interdependence by intro-
ducing barriers of uncertainty for both trade and financial
transactions. Yet this view can neither be reconciled easily
with my observation that economic activity has been more
synchronized under flexible than under fixed exchange rates,
nor with the general observation that the growth rate of trade
between the industrial countries has accelerated during the
1970s and 1980s.
More plausible is the argument that the switch to flexible
exchange rates has contributed positively to international
integration. With the advent of generalized floating, govern-
ments started to dismantle the controls on the free flow of
capital and goods which had been erected or kept in place
during the Bretton Woods years in order to gain some leeway for
autonomous policy actions. We have thus come closer to the
"spaceless closed economy embracing the whole world" that
Haberler (1937, p. 303) proposed as a starting point for the
analysis of the international aspects of business cycles.
According to Haberler (1937, p. 303-4), the three factors which- 20 -
disintegrate and divide that economy are transportation costs,
the imperfect mobility of capital, and national currency
autonomy. The first two disintegrating factors apparently have
diminished, and it is argued here that this may have partly
come about as a consequence of the establishment of Haberler's
third disintegrating factor, national currency autonomy, in
1973. ' Once the view of an integrated world economy is
accepted, the finding that business cycles are synchronized
across countries appears much less puzzling. It may then even
12) be appropriate to speak of a world business cycle.
 ;
Some observers, especially Feldstein and Horioka (1980),
claim, however, that capital markets are far from being inte-
grated perfectly. They find a high correlation of saving and
investment ratios in a cross-sample of 16 industrial countries
and conclude that, since most of any incremental saving remains
in the country in which the saving occurs, capital is not very
mobile internationally. This finding has provoked heavy
13) criticisms in numerous articles. ' For our purposes it
11) To be precise, national currency autonomy also existed in
the Bretton Woods years since countries had their own
currencies. However, Haberler (1958, pp. 425-6) distinguishes
between different degrees of currency autonomy, the highest
degree being completely free exchange rates.
12) This view could perhaps be labelled the "Geneva view" since
it appears repeatedly in publications of economists associated
with the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies;
see e.g. Swoboda (1983), Huber and Saidi (1983), Gerlach (1988)
and Everaet (1988). Furthermore, Haberler wrote the monograph
to which the view can be traced back during his stay in Geneva
at the League of Nations in the early 1930s.
13) For references, see Frankel (1989).- 21 -
suffices to note that, first, the original Feldstein-Horioka
analysis only covers the years from 1960-74 and, second, they
correlated data averaged over five-year periods. Thus, their
analysis applied to the Bretton Woods years only and was
intended to neglect short-term capital movements, which are
relevant in our context. Furthermore, updates of the original
analysis (Feldstein and Bacchetta, 1989; Frankel, 1989) show
that the degree of capital mobility, as measured by
saving-investment correlations, has increased in the 1980s.
These results have thus moved closer to the results from
different tests of capital mobility, such as that of Frankel
(1989), who finds that covered interest parity holds rather
well in a sample of. 25 countries, indicating that financial
markets are highly integrated.
But if the mobility of capital is indeed almost perfect,
why should business cycles be transmitted positively? Recall
that in the classic Mundell-Fleming analysis perfect capital
mobility leads to an inverse transmission of monetary
disturbances between countries. Positive transmission occurs in
the model in the case of a fiscal, or real, disturbance. It
would be tempting to conclude, therefore, that fiscal, or real,
shocks have played a dominating role in the transmission of
disturbances under flexible exchange rates. This conclusion is
welcomed especially by the proponents of the "real business
cycles" view, which figures prominently on current research
agendas. According to this view, business cycles are equi-
librium responses of optimizing agents to unpredictable shocks
to preferences and technology. Money does not play an active- 22 -
role in these models; the observed positive correlation between
money and output over the business cycle is viewed as a
reflection of money being endogenous rather than exogenous. In
the extended two-country version of the real business cycles
model, productivity shocks are transmitted positively across
countries and lead to an international synchronization of out-
put movements (Cantor and Mark, 1988). The nominal exchange
rate, like money, is absent from the analysis; that is, the
exchange rate regime does not matter for international trans-
mission. Therefore, it is difficult to explain the observed
sharp increase in the correlation of output movements after
1973 within the model: it is a priori very unlikely that shocks
to technology and preferences have become so much more im-
portant in the last two decades that they could explain the
differences in the international behavior of output movements
between the pre- and the post-1973 periods. However, since
there is currently much work employing and refining these
models in progress, it would be too early to pass a final
judgement on this issue.
Another way of reconciling theory with the facts has been
to extend the original Mundell-Fleming model in various ways to
include several neglected aspects. Since less restrictive
assumptions are unlikely to produce more definite results, it
becomes impossible to summarize the conclusions for the trans-
mission of business cycles of all the numerous extensions of
the Mundell-Fleming model. In some of the extended versions,
the sign of transmission is reversed, so that a monetary ex-
pansion in one country is transmitted positively to the other- 23 -
country. On the other hand, these models imply that fiscal
policies may no longer be transmitted positively, but rather
negatively.
There are at least four channels through which the tradi-
tional transmission results can be inverted. All of them work
through effects of the exchange rate on variables other than
14 1 the current account. ' First, if the demand for money depends
on a price index that includes the price of imports as well as
domestic goods, rather than only the price of domestic goods as
in the original model, the sign of transmission may change. For
example, the appreciation of the domestic currency in response
to a foreign monetary expansion will lower the consumer price
index and thereby increase domestic real money balances. This
may overcompensate the contractive effect of the appreciation
on domestic output through the trade balance. The second
channel works through the effect of the exchange rate on
domestic real wealth and is similar to the first effect.
Furthermore, the original transmission effect may be reversed
or reinforced depending on whether the country is a net debtor
or a net creditor in foreign currency (Corden, 1985b). Third,
if import prices enter the aggregate supply function through
imported intermediate goods, the contractionary impact of an
appreciation may be overcompensated by the positive impact of
14) I do not include here the Laursen-Metzler effect because if
it is built into the original Mundell-Fleming model it works in
such a way as to reinforce both the negative transmission of
monetary policies and the positive transmission of fiscal
policies.- 24 -
cheaper inputs on domestic output. Finally, wages are also
likely to respond to exchange-rate induced changes in the price
of consumer goods. In certain circumstances this may reverse
the standard transmission results (Dornbusch, 1983). In sum,
various modifications of the standard Mundell-Fleming model are
able to produce a positive transmission of monetary dis-
turbances. Yet at the same time these modifications lead to the
result that fiscal disturbances may be transmitted inversely.
To quote a somewhat resigned statement by Bordo and Schwartz
(1988, p. 458), "[w]hether the theoretical effect of
international transmission is positive or negative is thus
ambiguous. The results obtained appear to reflect the model-
builders ' priors."
To conclude this discussion of the first explanation for
the higher synchronization of business cycles, it is fair to
say that some of the synchronization is likely to have been
caused by positive transmission following from growing
integration among countries. Capital has become more mobile
after the move to flexible rates and there are many instances
in which capital mobility can lead to a positive transmission'
of business cycles.
In order to isolate the pure transmission effect, the
analysis so far has neglected an important aspect of the real
world, namely the reactions of domestic economic policy to
foreign influences. As Sohmen emphasized, one of the main ad-
vantages of the flexible exchange rate system is that,, in prin-
ciple, it allows the domestic monetary authorities to follow
domestic stabilization purposes. No matter whether foreign- 25 -
cycles are being transmitted positively or negatively to the
home country, monetary policies would always be free to
counteract undesired disturbances from abroad. This would lead
one to expect business cycles to be less synchronized under
flexible rates than under fixed rates. The observed discrepancy
between expectations and outcome can be rationalized in two
ways.
First, central banks may have tried to fight off foreign
disturbances in the way envisaged by Sohmen, but they may not
have achieved their aim. Monetary policy can influence output
only if there is some degree of money illusion in the economy.
The view that money illusion had been eroded by the overuse of
inflationary policies gained currency in the late 1970s and
contributed to the success of the new classical macroeconomics.
It has culminated in the view of the real business cycles
theory that money plays no role at all in the business cycle.
Flexible exchange rates certainly contribute to a shortening of
the time-lag between money and prices, at least for small
economies: if wages are indexed to consumer prices and if
foreign goods account for a large part of domestic consumption,
much of the monetary expansion will quickly end up in price
increases rather than in output increases. As a result of a
learning process, central banks may finally have abandoned
countercyclical policies in favor of policies aiming at
lowering inflation rates. Some evidence for this view is pro-
vided by the general disinflation in the course of the 1980s
and by the convergence of inflation rates in recent years.- 26 -
Second, monetary policy may still be able to influence
real activity, but it may not have been used to decouple do-
mestic output from foreign business cycles. Evidence for the
latter is provided by the fact that short-term monetary poli-
cies in industrial countries have also been synchronized under
flexible exchange rates (de Grauwe and Fratianni, 1984; Darby
and Lothian, 1989). The synchronization of monetary policies
could have been motivated by the wish to avoid the inflationary
or deflationary impacts of real exchange rate fluctuations
caused by divergent monetary or fiscal policies. The coordi-
nation of macroeconomic policies ranges high on the policy
agenda of finance ministers and heads of governments. Since
monetary policies are easier to coordinate than fiscal policies
and since exchange-rate movements are often seen as an evil by
policy makers, it does not come as a surprise that monetary
policies have been synchronized frequently. Consequently, this
also helps to explain the observed synchronization of business
cycles under flexible exchange rates.
The last explanation for the higher synchronization of
business cycles under flexible exchange rates to be examined in
this paper is the occurrence of real shocks exogenous to all
industrialized countries. The two oil shocks of the early and
the late 1970s are commonly cited as a case in point. There is
little that can be said against the interpretation that these
shocks have contributed to the synchronization of business
cycles and that there is nothing economic policy can do to
avoid the terms-of-trade deterioration vis-a-vis the oil-
producing countries. It is an open question, however, how much- 27 -
of the synchronization of business cycles can be attributed to
the oil shocks. The question, of course, can only be answered
(if at all) by a thorough empirical investigation, which is
beyond the scope of this paper. But the issue should not be
passed without noting that the common view of the oil shocks as
completely exogenous events may be fallacious to some extent.
It can be argued that the world-wide synchronized booms of the
early 1970s and of the late 1970s turned the oil market from a
buyers' market into a sellers' market and so contributed to the
oil shocks (Corden, 1985a, p. 152). While the world-wide boom
of the early 1970s can be attributed to the joint expansion of
the money supplies in the strait-jacket of the Bretton Woods
system, the second boom was initiated by the voluntarily
coordinated locomotive experiment agreed upon at the Bonn
Summit in 1978. Thus, the synchronization of monetary policies
and the two oil price shocks ought to be seen not as distinct
explanations, but rather as related causes for the high degree
of synchronization under flexible exchange rates.
IV. Conclusions
Disillusionment with flexible exchange rates on the
grounds of the feeling that they have not provided the promised
degree of insulation from foreign disturbances is not warran-
ted. This paper has presented evidence supporting the claim by
the early proponents of flexible exchange rates that countries
can make their price levels independent from foreign infla-
tionary or deflationary trends. This has been a major advantage- 28 -
of flexible rates, especially for those countries that tried to
stabilize domestic prices in the general inflationary environ-
ment of the 1970s. Furthermore, the prominent early advocates
and analysts of flexible exchange rates never promised complete
or automatic insulation from foreign business cycles. Some of
them, however, may have underestimated the positive effects of
the move to generalized floating on the economic integration
among countries and the resulting increase in the transmission
of business cycles across countries. Egon Sohmen's claim that
flexible exchange rates, in principle, allow individual
countries to neutralize some adverse foreign influences remains
valid. So far, it has not been subjected to a test because
short-term monetary policies have been synchronized under fle-
xible exchange rates to a considerable extent. Further research
should be directed at subjecting the different explanations
that have been put forward for the observed synchronization of
business cycles to empirical testing.- 29 -
Data Appendix
The following data were used for the calculations presented in
the two tables:
INFLATION RATES: Consumer Prices (64x) from World Tables in
International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics: Yearbook 1989, Washington, D.C., 1989; and in
International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics, August 1990.
Ml GROWTH: Money (34x) from World Tables in International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics: Yearbook
1989, Washington, D.C., 1989.
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: Quarterly index of industrial pro-
duction, seasonally adjusted, from OECD, Main Economic
Indicators , computer tape, Paris, 1990.- 30 -
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